Priyanka’s Sanchar Saathi spin: Cherry-picked clause, manufactured panic

New Delhi: Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Priyanka Chaturvedi has tried to turn a routine cybersecurity notification into a full-blown “snooping” scare. 

Her viral post on X, built around one line from the Department of Telecommunications’ (DoT) November 21 circular, is less about facts and more about feeding a ready-made narrative: Modi government equals mass surveillance.

The target this time is the Sanchar Saathi app.

मैं भारत के टेलीकॉम मिनिस्टर से रिक्वेस्ट करूँगी कि इसे ‘बेवजह की कॉन्ट्रोवर्सी’ कहने से पहले वे नोटिफिकेशन पढ़ लें। पेज 2, पॉइंट 7 B पढ़ें। इसमें साफ़-साफ़ लिखा है कि ऐप की फंक्शनैलिटी न तो डिसेबल है और न ही रिस्ट्रिक्टेड है। pic.twitter.com/0oSsT5SiZL

— Priyanka Chaturvedi🇮🇳 (@priyankac19) December 2, 2025

The DoT, under the Telecom Cyber Security Rules, 2024, has asked manufacturers and importers to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi app on all new mobile devices sold in India from February 2026.

In a market flooded with fraud calls, fake IMEIs and stolen phones, every new handset should ship with a ready, visible tool that can help users fight cybercrime.

Sanchar Saathi, launched in 2023, offers features like consent-based device tracking, SIM verification and fraud alerts. It is a security utility in a country where telecom scams are siphoning off thousands of crores every year.

Chaturvedi’s entire “spyware” pitch rests on one clause from the notification under Point 7(b), which she posted as supposed proof of a “mandatory full access” regime:

“Ensure that the pre-installed Sanchar Saathi application is readily visible and accessible to the end users at the time of first use or device setup and that its functionalities are not disabled or restricted.”

She spun this clause as the government forcing an undeletable spyware app on every Indian.

Read in full, it means something else.

The clause clearly talks about the first use or device setup. It ensures that when a user unboxes a new phone, Sanchar Saathi is visible and functional – the icon isn’t buried in sub-menus, and the features aren’t crippled at launch.

“Functionalities not disabled or restricted” means no half-baked or throttled version at setup. It does not say the app cannot be uninstalled. It does not say it must be granted full, perpetual access. It definitely does not say users will be forced to keep it forever.

The jump from “visible and working at first use” to “non-deletable surveillance app” is not a misreading. It is a narrative choice.

Telecom Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia addressed this head-on on December 1, stating clearly that Sanchar Saathi is optional.

“The app is totally up to you. It can be deleted anytime, and it activates only on user consent.”

The government’s role, he underlined, is to introduce the tool at setup so users know it exists and can use it if they want. After that, it is the user’s device and the user’s decision.

Even the same notification talks about software updates for existing devices and integration pathways, but nowhere does it create a non-removable, always-on surveillance layer.

It is in this context that the Pegasus analogy being thrown around appears to be pure rhetoric, not reading.

Sanchar Saathi is already in use to tackle the same fraud ecosystem that Opposition parties routinely complain about.

The app and portal have been used to flag fake connections, trace stolen phones and disrupt scam networks. They work on consent, IMEI-based tools and user triggers – not hidden interception.

Turning that into “Big Brother on every phone” is not a privacy intervention; it is a political stunt.

If Chaturvedi and others were serious about privacy, the obvious questions would be: what hard legal safeguards and audits exist around data collected by Sanchar Saathi, how is consent recorded and logged, and what penalties kick in for misuse by officials or vendors?

Instead, we get a cherry-picked line and a ready hashtag.

India’s telecom space is a soft target zone as seniors, small-town users and first-time smartphone owners are routinely hit by UPI scams, KYC frauds and fake call centres.

A pre-installed, deletable, consent-driven security app is a rational response.

Calling every state-backed digital tool “Orwellian” may win retweets, but it also chips away at public trust in genuine cyber security interventions. That suits politicians looking for a daily fight; it does not suit users who actually need protection.

Pre-installing an app that can be deleted is not the same as sneaking in non-removable spyware. Point 7(b) is about visibility and functionality, not forced, permanent access.

Scaring users by pretending otherwise is not “holding the government to account”; it is misleading them.

So yes, call out the government when it overreaches. But when the outrage itself is built on a distorted and stretched reading, that deserves to be called out, too.