Bengal's silent demographic shift: Unseen force of illegal migration and porous border

New Delhi: Since the Partition of 1947, West Bengal's demographics have seen a subtle but significant shift. Census data reveals the scale of this change: in 1951, Hindus made up 78.45% of the population and Muslims 19.85%.

By 2011, the Hindu share had dropped to 70.54%, while the Muslim population rose to 27.01%, totaling over 24.6 million Muslims in the state. Projections suggest the Muslim population could reach 30-35% by 2025, driven by higher fertility rates and ongoing illegal migration.

This transformation is acutely felt in border districts. For instance, Murshidabad is now 66.27% Muslim, and Malda is 51.27% Muslim.

Even districts like North 24 Parganas, with a 26% average, have pockets exceeding 60%.

Recent tensions, like the April 2025 violence in Murshidabad, have been linked by early Ministry of Home Affairs probes to Bangladeshi infiltrators. Bengali Hindus, including Partition refugees, report a growing sense of strain, economically, culturally, and politically, as these shifts unfold.

A retired Border Security Force (BSF) officer described the issue as one impacting "sovereignty, resources, and the soul of Bengal," with the root of the problem lying in the porous border.

Infiltration: Origins and organised networks

The 4,096-kilometre Indo-Bangladesh border, largely riverine and unfenced, acts more like a sieve than a barrier. Initial movements followed the 1947 Partition, but the flow intensified in the mid-1950s due to economic hardship and communal tensions in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

The 1971 liberation war further surged the influx. Unlike Hindu refugees who often sought formal asylum, Muslim migrants frequently integrated smoothly into West Bengal's Muslim-majority villages, aided by shared language.

What began as opportunistic crossings evolved into a systematic racket by the 1980s. Traffickers on both sides charge significant sums (Rs 7,000 to over a lakh) to orchestrate entry through unguarded points.

Intelligence Bureau (IB) officers call this a "well-oiled machinery."

Once across, infiltrators use safe houses in border hamlets, often bribing local politicians and police for passage.

High-profile cases, such as the assassination conspirators of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Majed and Risaldar Moslehuddin, living undetected in Bengal for decades with acquired Indian IDs, illustrate the depth of this entrenchment.

Post-1971, the influx shifted to poor economic migrants, blending into the informal workforce, and later included criminals, radicals, and, since 2017, Rohingyas.

Political patronage under successive state governments allowed this movement to flourish with minimal border enforcement.

Economic entrenchment and cultural erosion

Infiltrators didn't stay on the fringes; they established economic strongholds, often with political protection. They dominate informal sectors like fish farms (bheris), street vending, and small trades, often displacing local Hindus from their traditional livelihoods.

In Sandeshkhali, Rohingyas initially worked in fisheries but allegedly transitioned into enforcers for local figures, demonstrating a pattern of asserting control over resources.

This economic shift is accompanied by cultural erosion. In areas like Kaliganj, the rise in the Muslim population has led to reports of Hindu festivals being restricted or curtailed.

Accounts from residents highlight the human toll, such as families being forced to move inland after harassment disrupted rituals.

Former police observed signs of radicalization, madrassas preaching intolerance and external preachers stirring divisions, linking increased assertiveness to Trinamool Congress (TMC) appeasement.

This has also fostered economic crime: Enforcement Directorate (ED) raids in 2019 exposed operations generating an estimated Rs 5,000 crore annually from activities like fake documents and trafficking, often with suspected ties to radicals seeking demographic alterations.

State complicity and forged identities

Infiltration has been facilitated by an ecosystem of forged identities supported by governmental structures. Counterfeit documents, including Aadhaar cards (for Rs 20,000) and passports (for Rs 40,000), are readily available. ED raids revealed this network's scale and reach.

The case of Palash Adhikari (actually Sheikh Moinuddin from Bangladesh) acquiring false papers with the help of local TMC functionaries exemplifies this deceit.

In Sandeshkhali, Rohingyas obtained IDs through compliant panchayats, integrating them into the TMC's support base. Successive state governments have been accused of enabling this for a loyal vote bank. IB officers express frustration that the "state machinery protects them," and surveillance is often branded as anti-minority.

This complicity erodes sovereignty and amplifies political polarization, making demographics a key factor in electoral outcomes.